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II. THE SOURCES AND BINDING FORCE OF THE 
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
A. THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
The great dividing line in the historical development of the law of naval 
warfare must be drawn at the outbreak of the first World War in 1914, for 
what is generally referred to as the" traditional law" is substantially the 
law as it appeared at this date. In the main, the traditional law of naval 
warfare is customary in character, developing out of eighteenth and-par-
ticularly-nineteenth century practices. The various attempts to codify 
this customary law have never enjoyed the same degree of success that have 
attended similar efforts with respect to the codification of land warfare. 
There is no convention dealing with the regulation of naval hostilities that 
compares in scope and importance to the Regulations attached to Hague 
Convention IV (1907), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which dealt specifically with the 
conduct of naval warfare are few in number and, with the exception of 
XIII (1907) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Mari-
time War, of relatively minor significance .I 
Historically, the most important, and certainly the most controversial, 
disputes arising in the course of naval hostilities related to the extent and 
character of the right of ·belligerents to interfere on the high seas with 
private neutral trade. In the Declaration of London of 1909 the attempt 
was made to produce a generally acceptable codification of nineteenth cen-
tury practices in this area of the law. However, the Declaration was never 
ratified by any of the signatory states; and despite the occasional claims of 
belligerents and neutral states during the first World War that the Declara-
tion of London set forth the valid law regulating belligerent behavior at 
sea, it was not binding upon the naval belligerents in either World War. 2 
1 The Hague Conventions of 1907 relating to the conduct of naval warfare are: VI Status of 
Enemy Merchant Ships At the Outbreak of Hostilities; VII Conversion of Merchant Ships in 
Time of War; VIII Laying of Automatic Contact Mines; IX Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War; X Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention; 
XI Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Rights of Capture in Naval War; and XIII Con-
cerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Maritime War._ The United States ratified 
Conventions VIII, IX, X and XI. Convention XIII was adhered to by the United States subject 
to certain reservations (see pp. 2.18 ff.).-During the nineteenth century the most important 
Convention concluded for the regulation of maritime warfare was the Declaration of Pads 
(1856). On the present status of the rules making up the Declaration of Paris, see pp. 99-102.. 
2 For further remarks dealing generally with the Declaration of London, see pp. 187-9· 
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In the period of over four decades that has elapsed since the outbreak of 
the first World War there has been only one international instrument con-
cluded for the regulation of naval hostilities that has received general ad-
herence, and that instrument is the London Protocol of 1936 requiring sub-
marines to conform in their actions against merchant vessels to the rules of 
international law to which surface vessels are subject. 3 To the extent, 
then, that the traditional law has been changed, such change has come 
principally through the practices of two World Wars. 4 
In recent years attention has been increasingly called to the uncertainty 
that characterizes a substantial portion of this traditional law of naval war-
fare. The principal source of this uncertainty undoubtedly stems from the 
practices of the two World Wars. Although exaggerated accounts of the 
lawless behavior of the major naval belligerents frequently have been given 
there is no denying the fact that both wars-and particularly the second 
World War-witnessed the widespread violation of the traditional law. 
In the period following World War I it seemed plausible to contend that 
the circumstances of this conflict were exceptional (which, indeed, they 
were as judged by the circumstances of earlier wars), and that the effects of 
the war upon the traditional law had to be considered in the light of these 
exceptional circumstances. In general, this attitude led to the result that 
the traditional law-the law in force at the outbreak of World War I-was 
still considered, on the whole, to remain unimpaired. 
Thus H. A. Smith has observed that: 
After the armistice of 1918 opinion in the Allied countries 
tended to regard the experience of the w~.r as something both de-
plorable and exceptional. It was hoped that the authority of the 
old rules could be restored and this view found expression in the 
unratified treaty drawn up at the Washington Conference of 192.2., 
which declared in effect that submarines must obey the same rules 
as surface ships. Almost all the writers of textbooks assumed 
that the rules of 1914 were still in force, and that the departures 
from these rules could be attributed to temporary causes not likely 
to be repeated. The official manuals issued in many countries for 
the instruction of naval officers all assumed the same point of view. 5 
The general reaction that has followed in the wake of the second World 
War, a war that served largely to confirm and to carry still further the prac-
3 For the text and commentary upon the present status of the Protocol, see pp. 6310. It may 
be noted that the Protocol was very largely a restatement, in conventional form, of pre-existing 
rules of customary law applicable to the operation of surface vessels. 
• We are neglecting for the present the possible changes effected in the rules governing neutral-
belligerent relations that result from obligations states may assume by virtue of membership 
in collective security organizations (see pp. I7I-8o).-Afairly detailed account of the historical 
development of the law of naval warfare up to World War II is given by Raoul Genet, Droit 
Maritime Pour le Temps de Guerre (I936-38), Vol. I, pp. 57-91. 
5 H. A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (2.nd. ed., 1950), p. 72.. 
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uces initiated a quarter of a century earlier, has been quite different. The 
argument that the circumstances of this second conflict were exceptional 
appears, for obvious reasons, far less plausible and has been resorted to only 
infrequently. H anything, there now seems to be a widespread-though 
by no means unanimous-conviction that the experience of World War II 
must be considered as the probable standard for the future conduct of war 
at sea rather than an exceptional event of the past whose recurrence is un-
likely. 6 Occasionally, this more recent reaction has taken the form of ex-
pressing the belief that in modern war much of the traditional law is simply 
inapplicable given the far-reaching transformation of the nineteenth cen-
tury environment in which this law developed and from which it derived 
its meaning and significance. From this latter point of view it is insuffi-
cient to concentrate attention_ only upon the actual practices of the two 
World Wars. In addition, an inquiry must be made into the social, politi-
cal and technological developments that have led to these recent practices. 
The experience of the two World Wars is held-according to this view-to 
indicate not only the relative ineffectiveness of many of the traditional 
rules. Even more important is the allegation that the traditional law no 
longer bears a meaningful relationship to the contemporary-and, it is 
assumed, the future-environment. Hence, it is this ever widening gap, 
this growing tension, between the contemporary social, political and tech-
nological environment and the environment presupposed by the traditional 
law that will presumably determine the inapplicability of this law in future 
hostilities at sea. 7 
To a limited degree, the difficulties encountered in the endeavor to assess 
6 Among recent expressions to this effect, Julius Stone, op. cit., pp. 402.-q, so8-1o, 595160]; 
H. A. Smith, The Crisis in the Law of Nations (1947 ), pp. 33-66; H. Lauterpacht, "The Problem 
of the Revision of The Law of War," B. Y. I. L., 2.9 (1952.), pp. 373-7. It is an interesting gloss 
on the complexity of the attempt to evaluate the effects of recent practice on the traditional 
law that assertions as to the future ineffectiveness of this law are frequently made by writers-
including those cited above-who nevertheless insist upon the continued validity of this law. 
7 Thus the argument cited above usually places emphasis upon the fact that the traditional 
law developed from, and consequently presupposed for its operation, a certain type of state 
and a certain type of war. The conception of the state was not necessarily democratic, but it 
was a state with limited powers. It presupposed economic liberalism, with a clear distinction 
to be drawn between the activities of the state and the activities of the private individual. 
The nineteenth century conception of war was that of a limited war, limited not only in terms 
of the number of states involved in any conflict, but also limited in terms of the fraction of 
each belligerent's population which either actively participated in or closely identified itself 
with the conduct of war. Finally, this conception of war presupposed limited war aims on the 
part of belligerents, which in turn facilitated the introduction of effective restraints upon the 
methods by which these aims might be pursued. Perhaps the decisive factor in conditioning 
the development of the traditional law was the assumption that in any war a substantial num-
ber of states would refrain from participating in hostilities, and that the interests of these 
non-participants would have to be respected (see pp. 181-4). The conditions under which the 
two World Wars were fought, it is contended, have either placed in serious question or have 
swept away entirely these nineteenth century conceptions. 
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the impact of the two World Wars upon the traditional law may be lessened 
once it is recognized that the continued validity of this law is dependent 
upon a minimum degree of effectiveness. In a legal system characterized 
by a low stage of procedural development-as is the international legal 
system-the prolonged and marked ineffectiveness of a once valid rule 
would appear to result in rendering this rule no longer binding.8 In the 
case of customary rules-and they form the primary concern here-the 
requirement that continued validity must presuppose a minimum degree 
of effectiveness would seem almost compelling, for the creation of customary 
law depends upon a well-established practice of states that is accompanied 
by the general conviction that the practice in question is both obligatory 
and right. 9 The effectiveness of the practice which serves to create cus-
tomary law forms an essential prerequisite. Conversely, the invalidation 
of a rule of customary law may be brought about by a sustained and effec-
tive practice that is contrary to ·once-established custom, particularly a 
practice that has ceased to provoke either protest or reprisal on the part 
of interested states. Presumably, the same requirement of effectiveness 
may be considered applicable to general rules established by convention; 
rules that are neither obeyed nor applied by the parties to a convention 
over a substantial period of time may be considered as being no longer valid. 
The apparent ease with which the general relationship between the bind-
ing quality of the rules of war and the effectiveness of these rules may be 
stated should not prove misleading, however. In practice, the difficulties 
occur when the descent is made from the general proposition to the concrete 
case, and the question is posed: has this rule of customary (or conventional) 
law ceased to be valid for the reason that over a defined period of time it 
has been ineffective in regulating belligerent behavior? Merely to formu-
late the problem in this manner suggests the serious obstacles in the way 
of a practical and useful solution. 
There is, to begin with, no rule of positive international law indicating 
either the length of the period or the degree of ineffectiveness sufficient to 
invalidate established rules of custom (or convention), just as there is no 
rule determining the point at which established usage turns into custom. 
And although the development from usage to custom is a decisive one, 
since it is only after this development has occurred that we are entitled to 
speak of laws of warfare, it is frequently difficult to determine this point 
in time. Nor is the absence of precise criteria for the determination of 
these questions relieved by the presence of an international tribunal com-
petent to render authoritative and binding judgments in doubtful cases. 
In the absence of international tribunals competent to render such decisions 
in a manner binding upon states, the latter themselves must so decide, and 
8 In this sense, the "procedural development .. of a legal system refers to the process of effec-
tive centralization of the judicial, executive and legislative functions. 
g See, Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.Il · 
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the evidence of such decisions will commonly be manifested in the instruc-
tions many states issue to their naval forces, in the diplomatic correspond-
ence carried on by states, in the prize codes states enact when engaged in 
hostilities, and in the decisions rendered by national prize courts. Yet 
these ··decisions,'' insofar as they constitute an interpretation of the law 
of naval warfare, are not binding upon other states; the right of each 
state to interpret the law is not a right to decide this law in the sense that 
this interpretation is obligatory for other states. 10 
It is quite true that the absence of compulsory international tribunals 
affects the utility of conventional rules as well, since not infrequently the 
provisions of conventional rules are subject to widely varying interpreta-
tions.11 Nevertheless, in the case of customary rules this difficulty is 
normally magnified, since the degree of uncertainty as to the content of a 
customary rule is not only likely to be greater, but the very existence of the 
rule is in many instances the real subject of dispute. In the history of 
naval warfare controversies over the meaning or even the purported exist-
ence of customary rules have never been absent, and this uncertainty has 
had as a consequence the furnishing of belligerents with a convenient pre-
text for the taking of reprisals against allegedly unlawful behavior of an 
enemy. 
In short, the obvious consequences of the far-reaching decentralization 
characteristic of the international legal order are perhaps even more readily 
apparent in time of war than in time of peace, and the uncertainty produced 
by this condition is more clearly evident in the case of customary rules than 
in the case of conventional rules. Hence, even if it is generally admitted 
that a necessary relationship must exist between the validity and the 
effectiveness of the rules regulating the conduct of war at sea, the above 
considerations would appear to indicate that in practice a large number of 
these rules must continue to lead what might be termed a ·"shadowy 
existence.'' 
There is a further, and closely related, factor that contributes to the 
difficulty of rendering a satisfactory evaluation of the impact of recent 
practices upon the traditional law. During both World Wars the major 
10 "The technical organizational insufficiency of international law may, and in fact does, 
make it difficult to determine whether a state acts in accordance with, or contrary to, inter-
national law. . . . It is generally recognized that the root of the unsatisfactory situ-
ation in international law and relations is the absence of an authority generally_ competent 
to declare what the law is at any given time, how it applies to a given situation or dispute, 
and what the appropriate sanction may be. In the absence of such an authority, and failing 
agreement between the states at variance on these points, each state has a right to interpret , 
the law, the right of auto-interpretation, as it might be called. This interpretation, however, 
is not a 'decision' and is neither final nor binding upon the other parties." Leo Gross, "'States 
as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Auto-Interpretation," Law and Politics in 
tho World Community, pp. 76-7. . 
11 An example of such widely varying interpretations may be seen in the case of the provisions 
of Hague VIII (1907), dealing with the laying of automatic contact mines. See pp. 303-5· 
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naval belligerents deemed it necessary to conduct hostilities at sea largely 
upon the basis of measures whose legal justification-if the continued 
validity of the traditional law is assumed-could rest only upon the bel-
ligerent right of reprisal. The declaration of operational (war) zone 
within which neutral shipping was subject to special hazards, the indis-
criminate laying of mines, the resort to unrestricted aerial and submarine 
vvarfare, the substantial alteration of the traditional law governing block-
ade and contraband-these and other measures were based for the most 
part upon the belligerent claim of reprisal. There is no need, at this point, 
to consider the nature and permissible extent of the belligerent dght to 
resort to reprisals in maritime warfare, particularly when belligerent 
reprisals are found to operate principally against neutral shipping. 12 Nor 
is it necessary to examine in this connection the controversial question of 
ultimate responsibility for the initiation of the seemingly endless series of 
reprisals at sea. It is relevant to observe, however, that the resort to 
reprisals in both World Wars provided-in certain instances at least-a 
convenient method for evading the restrictions imposed by the traditional 
law, and, it has been contended, for effecting changes in this law that ordi-
narily would have been left to the explicit agreement of the interested 
states. 13 
At the same time, the care with which belligerents have frequently 
sought to base departures from the traditional law upon the right of re-
prisal against allegedly unlawful actions of an enemy 14 has had the result 
of denying the possibility of rendering an unambiguous interpretation of the 
measures which formed the content of these reprisals. Normally, the 
resort to reprisals may be interpreted as an affirmation of the continued 
validity of the law the violation of which forms the condition of the re-
prisal. A reprisal between belligerents is an act, otherwise unlawful, that 
is exceptionally permitted to a belligerent as a reaction against a previous 
violation of law by an enemy.15 Despite the evident desire of belligerents 
12 See pp. l87-9o, 2.53-8. 
13 
"In the sphere of maritime law the operation of reprisals in both World Wars has, in 
practice, replaced most of the traditional rules. In a sense, reprisals have often fulfilled the 
function which would normally have been left to the agreement between States, namely, that 
of the adaptation of the law to the changed conditions of modern warfare. For this reason it 
is not always profitable to inquire whose original illegality opened wide the flood gates of 
retaliation. It is sufficient to note that the torrent swept away with devastating thoroughness 
many of the elaborate, though often controversial, rules." H. Lauterpacht, "The Law of 
Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," B. Y. I. L., 2.1 (1944), p. 76. See also the pene-
trating comments of Julius Stone (op. cit., pp. 355-66, 366-7) on the "legislative function" 
of reprisals in naval warfare. 
14 A care which Nazi Germany did not abandon even at the height of her wartime victories. 
Thus the German "blockade" announcement of August 18, 1940, sought to justify the measures 
to be taken against enemy and neutral vessels upon the right of retaliation. For text of the 
German "blockade" announcement, see U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 
I94o, pp. 46-5o. Also, see pp. 2.96-305. 
15 On reprisals generally, see pp. 150-3. 
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in recent maritime warfare to use reprisals as a pretext for evading the tradi-
tional law, there is nevertheless considerable merit in the argument that 
the very care with vv-hich such departures were usually justified as reprisals 
indicates the continued existence of a conviction that behavior in conform-
ity with this law is normally both obligatory and right. It has already 
been observed that this conviction is a necessary element-along with the 
criterion of effectiveness-in the creation of customary law. It would ap-
pear equally true that the retention of this conviction must be taken into 
consideration when attempting to determine the continued validity of the 
traditional law. This consideration, therefore, must form a qualifica-
tion upon an uncritical use of the principle of effectiveness. 
There are, of course, limits to the significance that reasonably can be 
given to the claim of reprisals. This is especially so when acts resorted to 
as reprisals threaten to become part of the permanent structure of naval 
hostilities rather than a temporary and limited exception. Still, the fact 
that belligerents have felt the necessity to use the plea of reprisals when 
departing from the traditional law warrants the most careful inquiry before 
a rule of maritime warfare can be considered, with assurance, as no longer 
valid. 16 
B. THE BINDING FORCE OF THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
As a general rule, the binding force of conventional rules of war is limited 
to the contracting parties, and then only to the extent specified by the 
terms of the convention in question and by the conditions accompanying 
ratification or adherence. 17 On the other hand, the customary rules of the 
law of war are binding upon all states and under all circumstances. The 
16 The remarks made in the text above on the relationship between the validity and the 
effectiveness of the laws of war form a problem upon which succeeding chapters provide almost 
a continuous commentary. Indeed, it is surely no exaggeration to state that the effect of recent 
practice upon the traditional law constitutes the critical problem in any contemporary inquiry 
into the present status of the rules of naval warfare. Unfortunately, however, it is next to 
impossible to present a clear and satisfactory answer to this problem, largely for those reasons 
that have already been indicated in the preceding pages of this chapter. 
17 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.13b and notes thereto. All of the Hague Conventions 
of 1907 contain a provision known as the "general participation" clause, to the effect that the 
convention in question applies only to the contracting parties, and then only if all the belliger-
ents are parties to the convention. In strict law, therefore, these conventions are not binding 
unless the requirements of the general participation clause are met. During World Wars I and 
II some of these conventions were nevertheless"applied, despite the fact that not all the bellig-
erents were parties to the convention in question. In practice, s~ates have looked more to 
the element of reciprocity than to the formal standards of this clause. In addition, some.of 
the 1907 Hague Conventions have come to be considered as a codification of customary law, 
hence binding upon all belligerents irrespective of ratification or adherence-e. g., Hague 
IV, Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land. More recently, the contracting 
parties to multilateral conventions regulating the conduct of war have avoided the "general 
participation" clause. The common Article 2. paragraph 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
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statement is frequently made that reprisals form one clear exception to the 
binding force of customary rules. 18 However, this manner of formulation 
rna y easily prove misleading. The act of taking reprisals does not repre-
sent a restriction to the binding force of customary law. On the contrary, 
this law remains fully binding, and the act of taking reprisals is itself a 
clear indication of the continued binding force of the customary law the 
violation of which forms the condition for the act of reprisal. Reprisals 
do not represent-at least not in theory 19-an abandonment of the custom-
ary law (or the conventional law for that matter), but rather the enforce-
ment of that law; at the very least, reprisals represent an act of·· self help" 
permitted against a previous violation of law. 20 
Apart from reprisals, the principle of military necessity has generally 
been considered as the most important qualification to the binding force 
of both the customary and conventional law of war. Indeed, the extent 
to which this principle may be held to restrict the operation of the rules 
of war has provided one of the most disputed issues among writers. 21 
The core of the controversy has centered about the doctrine that interprets 
military necessity as serving to justify departure from any of the established 
rules of war when the observance of these rules either would endanger the 
on the Protection of Victims of War provides that the contracting Parties to the conventions-
in time of conflict-remain bound by the conventions, as among themselves, even though 
one of the belligerents is not so bound. Thus: ••Although one of the Powers in conflict may 
not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are Parties thereto shall remain 
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention 
in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.'' 
18 Thus Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit,. p. 2.31): "As soon as usages of warfare have by 
custom or treaty evolved into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under all circum-
stances and conditions, except in the case of reprisals as retaliation against a belligerent for 
illegitimate acts of warfare by the members of his armed forces or his other subjects." 
19 A different question, of course, concerns the practical effect of reprisals, particularly as 
operative in hostilities at sea. 
20 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2IJa. 
21 It should be made clear that in this context the principle of military necessity is considered 
as a rule of positive law and not as an ideal (or policy) influential in the development of the 
law of war. However, as a rule of positive law the principle of military necessity has been 
used in two quite different senses, which should be distinguished clearly. In the first sense, 
military necessity is held to constitute a restriction-whether explicit or implicit-upon the 
operation of the positive rules of custom and convention. Here military necessity refers to 
those exceptional conditions or circumstances in which behavior otherwise prescribed by estab-
lished rules of law may be disregarded. In the second sense, the principle of military neces-
sity forms a standard (along with the principle of humanity) for determining the legality 
of a weapon or method of warfare not already expressly regulated by a rule of custom or con-
vention. In the former sense, then, military necessity relates to restrictions upon the operation 
of existing rules; in the latter sense military necessity provides a standard for judging the legality 
of weapons and methods not already expressly regulated. It is the first meaning of the principle 
that is considered here, whereas the latter meaning is considered when dealing with the general 
principles governing the weapons and methods of warfare (see pp. 45-50). Article 2.2.oa of the 
Law of Naval Warfare includes both meanings within its definition of military necessity. 
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success of a military operation or would threaten the survival (self-preser-
vation) of a military unit. 22 In either circumstance, the principle of mili-
tary necessity is considered to be operative and to free belligerents from 
behaving in accordance with otherwise valid law. 23 
As against this interpretation of military necessity it has been argued, 
principally by English and American writers, that military necessity-
more precisely, that the circumstances held to constitute a condition of 
military necessity-can justify a departure from behavior normally de-
manded by the law of war only when conventional or customary rules 
expressly provide for the exceptional operation of military necessity. 24 
According to this latter interpretation-which is believed to be correct-
military necessity must be interpreted "to denote those exceptional cir-
cumstances of practical necessity contemplated by express reservations to 
be found in several Articles of the Hague Regulations and other Conven-
tions in regard to acts otherwise prohibited. The general principle is that 
conventional and customary rules of warfare are always binding upon 
belligerents and cannot be disregarded even in case of military necessity.'· 25 
22 In its classic form this doctrine is usually identified with the German proverb-kriegs-
raison geht vor kriegsmanier-necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare. The proverb is 
~omewhat misleading since it has not been used primarily to refer to the manner or usages of 
war (kriegsmanier )-which would raise no serious question-but rather to the established Taw 
of war (kreigsrecht)-which does raise a serious question. This is clear from the formulation of 
kriegsraison given by Leuder (quoted in The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public Inter-
national Law (1914), pp. 2.44-5) to the following effect: "Kriegsraison embraces those cases in 
which, by way of exception, the law of war ought to be left without observance. . . . When 
. .. the circumstances are such that the attainment of the object of the war and the escape 
from extreme danger would be hindered by observing the limitations imposed by the laws ot 
war, and can only be accomplished by breaking through these limitations, the latter is what 
ought to happen.·· 
23 Strictly speaking, this particular interpretation of military necessity does not deny the 
general validity of the customary and conventional law of war. Hence, military necessity is 
not used to deny the binding force (validity), in the formal sense, of these rules, though this 
may well be the practical effect of the doctrine. It is asserted, however, that this principle 
must be held to constitute an implied restriction to, and therefore can in the appropriate cir-
cumstances override, any otherwise valid rule of warfare. 
24 Examples of conventional rules providing for the exceptional operation of military necessity 
are: in land warfare, Article 2.3g of the Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV (1907) 
forbidding belligerents to "destroy or seize the enemy"s property, unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war··; in naval warfare, Article 16 of 
Hague Convention X (1907) requiring that "after every engagement the two belligerents, so 
far as military interests permit, shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded, 
and to protect them, as well as the dead, against pillage and ill treatment'' (Article 18 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of \Vounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea substantially repeats this earlier provision, save 
that it uses the words "take all possible measures to search for"'). 
25 N.C. H. Dunbar, "Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials,'" B. Y. I. L., 2.9 (1952.), p. 444· 
To the same effect, W. G. Downey, Jr. ("The Law of War and Military Necessity," A.]. 1.-L., 
47 (1953), p. 2.62.): " ... military necessity cannot justify an act by a military commander 
which disregards a positive rule of law or which goes beyond the express limitations of a 
34 
Hence, the principle of military necessity cannot be considered as superior 
to, and thereby restricting the operation of, all other rules of warfare, 
whether customary or conventional. On the contrary, it is the principle 
of military necessity that may be restricted by the positive law of war, and 
occasionally is so restricted. 26 Not everything necessary to the purpose of 
war is allowed by the law of war. 27 
qualified rule of law. Such acts always constitute a violation of the law of war." Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 2.32.): "These conventions and customary rules cannot be overruled 
by necessity, unless they are framed in such a way as not to apply to a case of necessity in self-
preservation." Also Erik Castren (The Present Law of War and Neutrality, (1954), p. 66): "This 
view (i. e., doctrine of kriegsraison) of the elasticity of the laws of war must be absolutely 
rejected as it cannot be legally justified and as its practical consequences are most dangerous." 
Section 2.2.oa of the Law of Naval Warfare speaks of the operation of military necessity when 
"not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war." (And see notes to this provision for further 
elaboration.) 
26 It has been pointed out by many writers that one reason why military necessity may not 
be invoked except when expressly provided for by rules of warfare is that in establishing these 
rules military necessity has already been taken into consideration. This is held to be particularly 
true of conventional rules. (And the preamble to Hague Convention IV (1907 ), fl,1rnishes some 
support for this opinion in declaring that: "according to the views of the High Contracting 
Parties, these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish 
the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit .... ") 'While this contention is 
justified in large measure, it is important to recognize, at the same time, that certain rules 
clearly do not allow for the operation of military necessity. Thus the prohibitions against 
killing prisoners of war-or helpless survivors at sea-are absolute, and circumstances of 
military necessity do not justify any departures from these prohibitions. To a certain extent, 
therefore, it is a fiction to maintain that the law of war has in each instance already taken into 
account the requirements of military necessity, since in some instances action is prohibited 
even though circumstances constituting military necessity may otherwise require the perform-
ance of the prohibited action. Article r common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states 
that: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances." [italics added] Finally, for an earlier-and emphatic-
statement in the German literature to the effect that military necessity can be invoked only 
in the case of norms specifically providing for the exceptional operation of military necessity, 
see J. L. Kunz, K.riegsrecht und Neutralittitsrecht (1935), pp. 2.6-8. 
27 With respect to this more restrictive interpretation of military necessity it has been recently 
stated that: "This reasoning . . . would forbid departure from the rules of war-law even in 
face of the direst needs of survival. Yet it remains ground common to British, American, French, 
Italian and other publicists, as well as German, that a State is privileged, in title of self-preser-
vation, to violate its ordinary duties under international law, even towards States with which 
it is at peace; and may also itself determine when its self-preservation is involved. Neither 
practice nor the literature explain satisfactorily how the privilege based on self-preservation 
in times of peace can be denied to States at war." Stone, op. cit., pp. 352.-3. Although the 
principle of military necessity more commonly refers "to the plight in which armed forces 
may find themselves under stress of active warfare" and not to "a danger or emergency of such 
proportions as to threaten immediately the vital interests, and, perhaps, the very existence of 
the state itself" (Dunbar, op. cit., p. 443), it is nevertheless true that departures from the law 
of war can be-and frequently have been-justified in terms of the states' "fundamental right" 
of self-preservation. To this extent Professor Stone is certainly correct in observing a contra-
diction between the latitude ascribed by writers to the states' "right of self-preservation" in 
time of peace and a denial of the same right in time of war. In fact, however, the criticism 
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It is this latter, and more restrictive, interpretation of military necessity 
that has recently received clear judicial endorsement. In the war crimes 
trials following the second World War the chief preoccupation of tribunals 
called upon to interpret the principle of military necessity was to determine 
when circumstances of military necessity could be considered as serving to 
justify departures from conduct normally prescribed by the rules of warfare. 
Although the judgments of tribunals were by no means identical on a num-
ber of points, there nevertheless was a remarkable uniformity of judicial 
opinion, which-taken as a whole-clearly appears to support the narrow 
interpretation of military necessity. The following is a brief summary of 
these judgments. 
(1) Military necessity may serve as a defense plea against charges of 
committing acts normally forbidden by the law of war only when the rule 
in question can be interpreted as permitting such exceptional departure in 
circumstances constituting a condition of military necessity. Thus in the 
Hostages Trial the tribunal stated that the prohibitions contained in the 
Hague Regulations "are superior to military necessities of the most urgent 
nature except where the Regulations themselves specifically provide the 
contrary .... " 28 In the case of conventional law the rule in question 
1nurt provide expressly for military necessity. In particular, where the pro-
hibition contained in a rule is absolute in character, military necessity 
cannot be used as a defense. Thus circumstances of military necessity have 
not been considered as justifying the killing of prisoners of war. 29 
Professor Stone properly raises points to the necessity of a "frank review of the meaning of 
the self-preservation" doctrine as it applies in time of peace. The right of self-preservation 
accorded to a state in time of peace must therefore be limited to a right of action against meas-
ures which are prima facie unlawful. Neither "necessity in self-preservation" in time of peace 
nor "military necessity" in time of war can be held to justify a departure from established law, 
if such departure is taken in response to acts admittedly lawful in character. 
28 (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others), Law Reports . .. , 8 (1949), p. 69. Elsewhere the Tribunal 
went so far as to state that "the rules of International Law must be followed even if it results 
in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation" 
(p. 67 ). In the Krupp Trial the tribunal declared that: ''It is an essence of war that one or the 
other side must lose and the experienced generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted 
the rules and customs of land warfare. In short these rules and customs of warfare are designed 
specifically for all phases of war." (Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 
and Eleven Others), Law Reports . .. , ro (1949), p. 139· Also see the Trial of Erhard Milch, 
Law Reports . . ·J 7 (1948), pp. 44, 64-5. 
In his excellent survey of these and other cases, Dunbar (op. cit., p. 452.) states that: ·-It seems 
likely that courts will be disinclined to enlarge the doctrine of military necessity beyond that 
countenanced by express reservations appearing in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The 
general principle is that belligerents must always respect and observe customary and conven-
tional rules of warfare." 
29 In the Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steimrt (Law Reports ... , 3 (r948), pp. 56-9) a 
United States Military Commission tried and sentenced the accused to death by hanging for 
unlawfully ordering and killing prisoners of war. At the time the offense was committed the 
accused were "part of a German unit which was cJosely surrounded by United States troops, 
from which the Germans were hiding. 
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(2.) In the case of rules allowing for the exceptional operation of 
military necessity, departure from normally prescribed behavior is justified 
for reasons of self-preservation or for insuring the success of a military 
operation. In addition, there must be an clement of urgency involved that 
allowed-or seemed to allow-no alternative course of action. However, 
it does not appear that it is essential to establish that the circumstances 
constituting a condition of military necessity were objectively present in a 
given situation. It is sufficient only to establish that the individual putting 
forth the plea of military necessity as a defense honestly believed at the 
time that such circumstances were present. 30 
30 This last point was given special emphasis in the Hostages Trial where one of the accused 
had been charged with the wanton destruction of property while retreating before Russian 
forces. The accused maintained that he acted only under circumstances he believed to consti-
tute a condition of military necessity, and that his behavior was justified by Article 2.3g of 
Hague IV (1907 ). In its judgment, the Tribunal stated: "There is evidence in the record 
that there was no military necessity for this destruction and devastation. An examination of 
the facts in retrospect can well sustain this conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the situa-
tion as it appeared to the defendant at the time. If the facts were such as would justify the 
action by the exercise of judgment, after giving consideration to all the factors and existing 
possibilities, even though the conclusion reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to 
be criminal." (Trial of Wilhelm List ana Others) Law Reports . .. , 8 (1949), pp. 68-9. A 
substantially similar-conclusion was reached by the Tribunal in the German High Command 
Trial (Trials of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others) Law Reports ... , 12. (1949), pp. 93-4. 
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